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The range of goods 
 exported to the U.S. has 
increased substantially, 
with little evidence that 
tariff liberalization is a 
primary cause.
S
ustained growth of international trade since World War II has 
coincided with an array of trade agreements and gradual reduc-
tion of tariffs.
How much declining tariffs boosted commerce and the impact of lib-
eralized trade rules on a country’s standard of living have been a central 
focus of trade-policy economic research. The welfare effects of trade liber-
alization can be quite different when viewed from either of two perspec-
tives—from the intensive margin, where liberalizing countries import more 
of the same goods, or from the extensive margin, where countries import a 
greater variety of items. If a trade policy’s impact on the extensive margin 
is significant, the benefits of liberalization, or the costs of protection, are 
potentially much higher.
The  distinction  between  intensive  and  extensive  margins  is  quite 
important since countries’ exports vary across industries and among trading 
partners, with commercial patterns changing over time. The range of goods 
countries trade tended to increase substantially following implementation 
of some preferential trading agreements that eliminated barriers. 
However, the actual contribution of lower tariffs may be, in fact, quite 
modest relative to growth in the variety of exports constituting the exten-
sive margin.
The Extensive Margin Matters
In many cases, the benefits of a lower tariff are seen in reduced con-
sumer prices. If goods were already being consumed, this price decrease 
is directly observable. On the other hand, if liberalization yields a wider 
range of available goods, when consumers value variety, they benefit even 
if the prices of goods already imported don’t change. 
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Price indexes for a given basket of 
goods are meant to reflect the cost of 
acquiring  a  certain  level  of  consumer 
satisfaction. If a preference for variety 
exists, import price indexes should be 
adjusted  to  reflect  the  range  of  avail-
able goods. Ignoring a tariff reduction’s 
effects on the extensive margin leads to 
overestimating  the  import  price  index 
and, consequently, underestimating the 
benefit of liberalization. 
Evolution of U.S. Tariffs 
U.S. trade policy varies across 
countries in accordance with a hand-
ful of bilateral and multilateral trade 
agreements. The most-encompassing 
obligations are dictated by member-
ship in the World Trade Organization 
(WTO), which constrains the U.S. 
tariff on all member countries to the 
U.S.’s most-favored nation (MFN) rate.1 
WTO rules still allow the U.S. to offer 
lower tariffs to countries with whom 
it engages in formal trade agreements. 
Reductions in tariffs over time, through 
the WTO or other preferential arrange-
ments, are achieved over a series of 
multilateral and bilateral negotiations. 
However, liberalization of U.S. trade in 
recent years has been modest relative 
to trade growth.
I focus on changes occurring over 
two 10-year periods: 1989 to 1999 and 
1996 to 2006, following the work of 
Debaere and Mostashari (2010).2 These 
two intervals are particularly relevant 
for U.S. trade. The first straddles for-
mation of the North American Free 
Trade Agreement (NAFTA) in 1994, 
which mandated the gradual elimina-
tion of barriers among member coun-
tries—the U.S., Canada and Mexico. 
The latter overlaps China’s accession to 
the WTO in 2001.
Between 1989 and 1999, the aver-
age U.S. manufacturing tariff decreased 
by about 0.9 percentage points. 
Between 1996 and 2006, the average 
decrease was larger, 3.4 percentage 
points. Changes in average tariffs for 
NAFTA countries and for nations receiv-
ing MFN rates are shown in Chart 1. Not 
surprisingly, U.S. tariffs between 1989 
and 1999 fell most for Canada, 4.8 per-
cent, and Mexico, 3.1 percent. However, 
between 1996 and 2006, with NAFTA 
tariffs already low, MFN rate decreases 
dominated, averaging 4.9 percent.
Mexico’s and Canada’s increased 
trade with the U.S. resulting from 
NAFTA has been well documented. 
Less effort has gone into comparing 
countries that have experienced trade 
liberalizations with those that have 
not. Detailed trade data highlight two 
findings of particular interest. First, 
extensive-margin growth has been 
substantial for most countries, not just 
for Mexico and Canada. Second, there 
is no obvious relationship between 
U.S. tariff decreases and the extent of 
extensive-margin growth.
Summary statistics for 3,328 goods 
possibly exported by 177 countries are 
presented in Table 1. For the period 
1989 through 1999, the extensive mar-
gin increased significantly, especially for 
Mexico. The nation exported 2,572 of 
the 3,328 possible goods categories in 
1989, 1999 or both. Yet, 26 percent of 
those goods were newly traded post-
NAFTA, and 10 percent of those goods 
stopped being traded post-NAFTA. Note 
that the share of newly traded goods for 
Canada was less, 8 percent. This lower 
number isn’t surprising, since bigger 
and more-developed countries tend to 
export more types of items. Moreover, 
given the finite number of goods as a 
share of a country’s exports, the exten-
sive-margin increase should be more 
manifest for less-developed countries.
In the most striking finding, many 
other countries whose tariffs with the 
U.S. did not decrease dramatically 
had comparably large shares of newly 
traded goods. For example, China 
exported 2,504 categories of goods in 
1989, 1999 or both, and 34 percent of 
these traded goods were newly traded 
in 1999. Similarly, combining the rest 
of the countries’ goods into a sepa-
rate observation, 30 percent of traded 
goods were newly traded in 1999. 
The shares of disappearing and 
new goods are presented in the last 
two columns of Table 1. Both columns 
suggest significant changes in the 
range of goods. The statistics reported 
for the period 1996–2006 show a per-
sistent change in the extensive margin. 
Newly traded goods’ share of 
total traded goods is plotted against 
average changes in tariffs in Chart 2, 
which illustrates that extensive-margin 
growth was not limited to countries 
experiencing systematic U.S. tariff cuts. 
Furthermore, for a given tariff reduc-
tion, the importance of newly traded 
goods varied substantially across coun-
tries. For instance, nearly 40 percent of 
the goods China exported to the U.S. 
in 1999 were newly traded (Chart 2A). 
The importance of new trade for other 
countries receiving the same MFN tariff 
changes ranged from 11 percent of 
traded goods for Japan to 100 percent 
for several small developing countries. 
A similar situation prevails for the 
1996–2006 period (Chart 2B).3
When Tariffs Don’t Matter
These observations suggest that 
U.S. tariff reductions don’t entirely 
explain why the extensive mar-
gin changes. This is also argued by 
Debaere and Mostashari (2010), who 
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estimate how changing the U.S. tariff 
rate affects the probability of a country 
exporting a particular good to the U.S. 
While they find that lower U.S. tariffs 
increase the range of goods that coun-
tries export, the contribution to exten-
sive-margin growth does not seem 
economically significant. Between 
1989 and 1999, U.S. tariff liberalization 
explained, at most, about 5 percent of 
the actual net growth in the range of 
goods that countries exported to the 
U.S., the authors discover. Between 
1996 and 2006, owing mainly to the 
larger reductions in MFN tariffs, they 
find a greater but still small contribu-
tion of U.S. tariffs, explaining up to 12 
percent of the export increase. 
There are several likely reasons 
why tariffs don’t seem to matter for 
the variety of goods the U.S. imports. 
In some instances, substantial fixed 
costs must be incurred for firms to start 
exporting to a market. For example, 
there are expenses for learning about 
demand and for establishing a dis-
tribution system.4 Additionally, some 
countries may not have the technology 
to produce certain goods. In this case, 
firms would need to incur research 
and development costs or even roy-
alties or license fees. Modest tariff 
reductions are insufficient to offset the 
fixed costs of entry. This suggests that 
cutting tariffs primarily helps increase 
exports already coming to market, 
those at the intensive margin.
These results leave open the 
question of what drives changes in 
the extensive margin. Country- and 
industry-specific factors, apart from 
U.S. tariff changes, make a bigger dif-
ference. The largest contributing factor 
is the change in real per-capita gross 
domestic product, which, according 
to Debaere and Mostashari (2010), 
explains approximately 46 percent of 
the extensive margin growth between 
1989 and 1999. 
Influencing Export Variety
The range of goods exported to 
the U.S. has increased substantially, 
with little evidence that tariff liberaliza-
tion is a primary cause, Debaere and 
Mostashari (2010) confirm. While these 
findings may be specific to the U.S. 
and the small tariff decreases in recent 
years, other factors related to produc-
tivity and economic growth appear 
to be more important in explaining 
increased export variety.
Mostashari is a visiting scholar at the 
Globalization and Monetary Policy Institute  
of the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas. 
Table 1
Extensive-Margin Growth Is Substantial in Many Countries
1989–99













share of 1989 
trade volume 
(percent)
Newly traded goods’ 
share of 1999 
trade volume 
(percent)
Canada   3,100 8.16 7.74 84.10 3.6 4.4
Mexico   2,572 26.44 10.30 63.26 6.7 9.6
China   2,504 33.59 5.99 60.42 2.3 5.1
Rest of the world 74,480 30.04 18.50 51.45 6.8 9.9
 1996–2006













share of 1996 
trade volume 
(percent)
Newly traded goods’ 
share of 2006 
trade volume 
(percent)
Canada   3,045 6.73 7.03 86.24 1.4 3.7
Mexico   2,641 14.24 12.87 72.89 1.5 4.8
China   2,958 29.18 2.13 68.70 0.6 3.5
Rest of the world 81,545 30.17 16.17 53.67 3.6 12.1
1 Number of goods exported at the beginning or end of the time frame out of 3,328 manufacturing commodities.
2 Goods exported at the end but not the beginning of the time frame.
3 Goods exported at the beginning but not the end of the time frame.
4 Goods exported both in the beginning and end of the time frame.
SOURCE: Author’s calculations using data from the U.S. International Trade Commission and Debaere and Mostashari (2010). EconomicLetter  is  published  by  the 
Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas. The views expressed 
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the source is credited and a copy is provided to the 
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Dallas.
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Notes
1 As of July 2008, there were 153 member na-
tions in the World Trade Organization.
2 For technical details regarding the level of 
aggregation and the sampled countries, see 
“Do Tariffs Matter for the Extensive Margin of 
International Trade? An Empirical Analysis,” by 
Peter Debaere and Shalah Mostashari, Journal 
of International Economics, vol. 81, no. 2, 2010, 
pp.163–69.
3 A graph with newly traded goods’ share of the 
value of trade looks much the same. 
4 See “Entry, Expansion and Intensity in the U.S. 
Export Boom, 1987–1992,” by Andrew Bernard 
and Bradford Jensen, Review of International 
Economics, vol. 12, no. 4, 2004, pp. 662–75, and 
“Why Some Firms Export,” by Andrew Bernard 
and Bradford Jensen, Review of Economics and 
Statistics, vol. 86, no. 2, 2004, pp. 561–69. 
Chart 2
Newly Traded Goods Not Related to U.S. Tariff Cuts
A. 1989–99
Newly exported goods/total exported goods, 1999 (percent)













Newly exported goods/total exported goods, 2006 (percent)












NOTE: Each dot represents an individual nation’s trade activity; purple = NAFTA countries, green = MFN countries.
SOURCE: Author’s calculations using data from the U.S. International Trade Commission.